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BIOPROSPECTING LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: WHAT WE ARE DOING, WHAT WE ARE
NOT DOING, AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT
EMILY J. STOLFER

*

ABSTRACT
Bioprospecting is a growing worldwide effort to protect knowledge and the
environment. With its potential economic benefit and technological advancements,
bioprospecting will continue to grow as the world advances. Other nations have
begun to protect the information available and continue to develop legislation.
However, the United States has been hesitant to ratify international treaties or
implement its own legislation. This Note examines both domestic and international
efforts to protect both indigenous people and the environment. It analyzes the
legislation the United States currently has in place but also examines where the
United States is lacking. Regarding the United States’ failure to implement national
legislation, this Note analyzes how two states that have tried to implement local
bioprospecting legislation, instead. Finally, this Note makes a recommendation of
what the United States or individual states should do in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In Leonardo DiCaprio’s acceptance speech for Best Actor in a Drama at the 2016
Golden Globes, he ended his remarks by stating, “It is time that we recognize your
history and that we protect your indigenous lands from corporate interests and
people that are out there to exploit them. It is time that we heard your voice and
protected this planet for future generations.”1 One of the biggest threats to these
* J.D., expected May 2017. B.A. in Communications and Political Science from John
Carroll University. Emily would like to thank her parents, Anne and Greg, for all of their love
and support throughout the years. Your love is not quantifiable; thank you for that. Also,
thank you to Gregory and Matthew for being awesome siblings and teaching me the
importance of bird law. Finally, thank you to my friends for all of the laughter.
1
NBC, Leonardo DiCaprio Wins Best Actor in a Drama at the 2016 Golden Globes,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ncgFQAISaGo. For a more in-
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lands is bioprospecting. Bioprospecting has many definitions, as stated below, but
generally it is “searching wild plants, animals and microorganisms—that is,
biodiversity—for genetic and biochemical information.”2 Environmental issues have
been at the forefront of policy discussions, and with most of the focus on global
warming and sustainable green energy, other environmental issues that are just as
important get placed on the backburner.3
Bioprospecting has many definitions. The Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) defines it as “the exploration of biodiversity for commercially valuable
genetic and biochemical resources.”4 Each definition can vary significantly but
contains the same framework.5 For example, one definition states, “Bioprospecting
involves searching for, collecting, and deriving genetic material from samples of
biodiversity that can be used in commercialized pharmaceutical, agricultural,
industrial, or chemical processing end products.”6 The bioprospecting definitions
usually contain the concept of gathering or collecting genetic material found in
nature that may be used for value.7
depth analysis of indigenous tribes, see Erik B. Bluemel, Separating Instrumental from
Intrinsic Rights: Toward an Understanding of Indigenous Participation in International RuleMaking, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 55 (2006) [hereinafter Bluemel, Separating Instrumental from
Intrinsic]; Nancy Kremers, Speaking with a Forked Tongue in the Global Debate on
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual Property Law and Policy
Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native American Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004); Jennifer Amiott, Investigating the Convention on
Biological Diversity’s Protections for Traditional Knowledge, 11 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 3 (2003).
2
Andrea Aseff, First Federal Prohibition on Bioprospecting Within a Place of
Protection: Time to Spur the Legislative Dialogue, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 189,
190 (2011) (citing John R. Adair, The Bioprospecting Question: Should the United States
Charge Biotechnology Companies for the Commercial Use of Public Wild Genetic Resources,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 132-33 (1997)).
3

This paper mostly will discuss bioprospecting, which is the legal form of biopiracy, but
in some academic literature these terms are used interchangeably. Biopiracy is referred to as
“the appropriation of the knowledge and genetic resources of farming and indigenous
communities by individuals or institutions that seek exclusive monopoly control . . . over these
GRP.,
resources
and
knowledge.”
Patents
&
Biopiracy,
ETC
http://www.etcgroup.org/issues/patents-biopiracy (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
4

Lydia Slobodian et al., Bioprospecting in the Global Commons: Legal Issues Brief 1,
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/Biosprecting-Issuepaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 20,
2016).
5
Compare Slobodian et al., supra note 4, with Peter G. Pan, Bioprospecting: Issues and
Policy
Considerations
iv,
LEGIS.
REFERENCE
BUREAU
(2006),
http://lrbhawaii.info/lrbrpts/05/biocon.pdf.
6
Pan, supra note 5; see also Nuala Moran, Microbial Wealth: Bioprospecting the
Microbial Communities That Colonize Our Bodies is Starting to Throw Up Opportunities for
Commercial Exploitation of the Microbiome 22, CHEMISTRY & INDUS. (2014) (“We can push
the gut microbiota in a health-promoting and health-sustaining way . . . We are not talking
about probiotics, but products that will be put through clinical trials”) (internal quotations
omitted).
7

Who

See Bioprospectors Feel Backlash in Hawaii: Patents on Taro Plant Outrage Some
See
it
as
a
Sacred
Symbol,
NBC NEWS
(Jan.
21,
2006),
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Anything with a commercial value has the opportunity to be exploited without
the right protection and especially when the plant or organism in its original state can
be extremely profitable.8 If companies have unregulated, unlimited access to these
resources, the biodiversity they need for new biotechnologies will be destroyed, and
“‘the wonderfully unusual accomplishment of discovering and eradicating in the
same instant a new species’”9 will become a reality. Even though the practice of
bioprospecting has been around for over one hundred years,10 the potential profits
that nanotech and biotechnological companies seek from bioprospecting are
relatively new due to society’s technological advances.11 For example, in South
Africa, the government established the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) to help individuals, including indigenous groups, obtain patents.12 The San
People of South Africa used CSIR to develop the active ingredient in the Hoodia
cactus.13 However, the CSIR sold the patent information to a British pharmaceutical
company, leaving the San People incapable of receiving profits from benefit
sharing.14 Without regulations, both the environment and individuals can be robbed
of their rights due to commercial greed.15

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/10945323/ns/technology_and_science-science/t/bioprospectorsfeel-backlash-hawaii/#.V9YMYlUrLIU (explaining key ingredients to medication were found
through bioprospecting processes, like drugs for breast cancer and painkillers).
8

See Gina Kolata, In Ancient Times, Flowers and Fennel for Family Planning, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 8, 1994, at C10 (explaining that the Romans used silphium, a plant, “to prevent
pregnancies and induce abortions”). Silphium perhaps was effective almost 100 percent of the
time, as evident from recent studies of rats ingesting a similar plant. Id. Romans used silphium
so much that they drove the plant to extinction. Id.
9
Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional Wisdom on the
Relationship Between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 31 ELR 10625 (2001)
(citing BILL BRYSON, A WALK IN THE WOODS: REDISCOVERING AMERICA ON THE APPALACHIAN
TRAIL 92 (1998)).
10

See Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 93 F.Supp.2d 63, 65 (2000) (“[T]he earliest research
permit authorizing collection of microbial samples from Yellowstone was in 1898.”).
11

Genecore International Inc., a profitable biotechnology company, earned “$13 million
in the first quarter of 2004 on $94 million in Revenue.” Bioprospecting in Nature Fuels
Debate, NBC NEWS (Jul. 7, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5295305/ns/us_newsenvironment/t/bioprospecting-nature-fuels-debate/#.V89JJ62xnVJ.
12

Tak Jong Kim, Expanding the Arsenal Against Biopiracy: Application of the
Concession Agreement Framework to Prevent Misappropriation of Biodiversity, 14
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 69 (2010).
13

Id.

14

Id.

15

How Does Biodiversity Loss Affect Me and Everyone Else?, WORLD WIDE FUND FOR
NATURE,
http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/biodiversity/biodiversity_and_you/
(last
visited Sept. 7, 2016) [hereinafter WWF]. Ecosystem surveys are valued to an estimated
amount of $33 trillion per year, which is more than the United States’ and the European
Union’s combined GDP for the year. Approximately 50,000 to 70,000 plant species are used
in medicine and about 100 million metric tons of aquatic life are harvested every year. A
significant loss of biodiversity would greatly damage the international ecosystem.
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Biodiversity loss greatly threatens human wellness, especially in developing
parts of the world, where water and food sources, the bare necessities of human
survival, are sparse.16 Biodiversity is the underpinning of all life and necessary for
human survival.17 Biodiversity is currently eroding at significant rates (twenty to
fifty percent) due to human use,18 and the erosion is most significant in undeveloped
or developing areas.19 Without biodiversity, our lifeline of food and water will not be
able to sustain future populations, which could lead to resource wars, creating a true
game of survival of the fittest.20
This Note will address four different ways the United States has tried to regulate
bioprospecting internationally and domestically. It will then analyze the pros and
cons of the bioprospecting regulations and suggest a federal call to national
bioprospecting legislation with a presentation of specific legislation to help protect a
state’s individual interests, encompassing the public and private property rights of
both the government and individuals.21
II. BACKGROUND
A. Convention on Biological Diversity
The CBD was adopted in 1992 to help conserve biological diversity and establish
rules for fair and equitable benefits for sharing genetic resources.22 In the CBD’s
quest to help preserve biodiversity, the convention addressed the topics above as
well as intellectual property rights concerning the biotechnology derived from
genetic resources.23 The CBD noticed that biological diversity is a key asset to our
society for both present and future generations.24 Current unregulated practices
16

Sandra Diaz et al., Biodiversity Loss Threatens Human Well-Being, PLOS (Aug. 15,
2006),
http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.0040277
(“[E]cosystem services may decrease the quality of life of these vulnerable population . . .
Biodiversity change is therefore inextricably like to poverty.”).
17

WWF, supra note 15.

18

NEVILLE ASH & ASHGAR FAZEL, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 4 (GEO-4):
ENVIRONMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 162 (Neville Ash & Asghar Mohammadi Fazel eds., 2007).
19

Id. at 160.

20

INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., CONSERVING THE PEACE: RESOURCES, LIVELIHOODS AND
SECURITY 34-35 (Richard Matthew et al. eds., 2002).
21
As later presented, each state may have individual interests it would like to protect,
especially if the state is particularly rich in biodiversity (for example, Hawaii and Alaska). See
infra Part II(D).
22
History of the Convention, CBD, https://www.cbd.int/history/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2015); Chen, supra note 9, at 10630. Chen states, “If even casual hiking affects the
distribution of population of wildlife, purposeful bioprospecting expeditions can leave a deep
human footprint. The need for government intervention is far more urgent in the biosphere
than in the ionosphere; unlike the supposedly ‘scarce’ but physically inexhaustible
electromagnetic spectrum, natural resources can be depleted through unpatrolled
exploitation.”
23

Guri Bang, Signed But Not Ratified: Limits to U.S. Participation in International
Environmental Agreements, 28 REVIEW OF POL’Y RESEARCH 65, 72-73 (2011).
24

History of the Convention, supra note 22.
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continue to deplete the Earth’s biodiversity; the CBD only has five of its indicators
making sufficient progress while sixteen currently show negative trends.25
Specifically, in the Amazon, up to 8,700 species of trees are endangered due to
deforestation, and the proportion of plants that are endangered has increased to onefifth.26
As of today, 196 countries have signed onto the CBD and its mission.27 However,
the U.S. is not a party to the CBD.28 Even though President Bill Clinton signed the
CBD in 1993, Congress failed to ratify because it would rather “deal with traderelated issues with environmental implication in the WTO [World Trade
Organization] rather than in international environmental regimes.”29 Clinton signed
the CBD because the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) did not address the biological diversity concerns highlighted in the
CBD.30 Congress’s concern was the opposite. Congress thought the CBD did not
properly address intellectual property rights, private property rights, or consequences
for land use polices.31 Although the Senate had a simple majority in favor of the
CBD, it did not have the votes to ratify.32 The Senate, moreover, has not voted to
ratify since 1994.33 The U.S. concern of the CBD not addressing intellectual and
private property rights shows the controversy between the need for biotechnological
advancement and the protection of biodiversity.34 The TRIPS agreement does not
address Congress’s concerns of land use policies, private property, or financing the
project, which Congress stated was similar to the problems it encountered with the
Endangered Species Act.35 Congress did not want tougher land-use policies that
would interfere with the rights of landowners, specifically ranchers and farmers.36

25

G7 ELMAU PROGRESS REPORT, BIODIVERSITY—A VITAL FOUNDATION FOR A
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015), http://www.bmz.de/g7/includes/Downloadarchiv/G7Elmau-Progress-Report-2015-Biodiversity-A-vital-foundation-for-sustainabledevelopment.pdf.
26
Half of the Amazonian Tree Species are Endangered, SCI. DAILY (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/02/160210111733.htm.
27
List of Parties, CBD, https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml#tab=0 (last visited
Feb. 13, 2016).
28

Pan, supra note 5, at 24.

29

Bang, supra note 23, at 72.

30

Id. at 73.

31

Id. at 74.

32

Id. at 75.

33

Id.

34

Chen, supra note 9.

35

Bang, supra note 23, at 75.

36

Id.
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The CBD helps protect developing countries and indigenous groups through
protocols, such as prior informed consent (PIC).37 PIC is a two-step process.38 First,
it requires the bioprospector to obtain permission per a nation’s protocol.39 Second,
the bioprospector must obtain this permission from the specific community where
they are extracting materials. 40 PIC requires an understanding of what the researcher
or company is doing within the community.41 It also requires the bioprospector to
enter a written agreement with the community stating that the community
understands what will be taking place.42 Usually, other benefit-sharing provisions are
also discussed during the PIC process and can be put into a contract with the native
tribes or landowners. The U.S. does not require PIC, allowing companies to “engage
in biopiracy, patent any invention . . . resulting from the research on stolen biological
resources and innovations, and prohibit other nations from utilizing their own
resources.”43 Without PIC protections, individual bioprospectors can independently
contract without a landowner’s permission and without fully explaining what the
bioprospector will do on the land.44 This is similar to the problem with fracking,
which is loosely regulated.45 Similar to bioprospecting, fracking has no
comprehensive regulatory regime.46 Private actors protect themselves through private
laws even though their actions have an adverse effect on the environment and
public.47 This legally allows companies to extract materials from nature without
permission from areas except national parks, such as Utah and certain parts of
Hawaii.48 But usually, laws derived from the CBD discourage companies from
investing in bioprospecting.49

37

U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON FREE, PRIOR, AND
INFORMED CONSENT AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: CONTRIBUTION OF THE CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 1 (2005).
38

Id. at 5.

39

Id.

40

Sabrina Safrin, Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The
International Conflict to Control the Building Blocks of Life, 98 A.J.I.L. 641, 649 (2004).
41

Id. at 654-55.

42

Id. at 654.

43

Laura Grebe, Requiring Genetic Source Disclosure in the United States, 44 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 367, 369 (2011).
44

Id. at 384.

45

See Shalanda Helen Baker, Is Fracking the Next Financial Crisis? A Development Lens
for Understanding Systemic Risk and Governance, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 229 (2015).
46

Id. at 237.

47

Id. at 254-55 (noting that one of the harms of fracking is the leaking of natural gas and
fracking fluid to mix with the water supply).
48

Id. at 256.

49

Safrin, supra note 40, at 668. Some argue that due to the decline in biodiversity, there
is a need to develop technologies and pharmaceuticals prior to the depletion of the resources.
See Aseff, supra note 2, at 197.
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The CBD sets guidelines for countries to follow when creating legislation to
protect both biodiversity and the rights of an area’s indigenous people.50 The
majority of the countries belonging to the CBD are developing countries, which are
seeking to protect themselves from corporate exploitation.51
B. Nagoya
The CBD’s most recent attempt for the conservation of biological diversity and
benefit-sharing of genetic material between countries is the Nagoya Protocol.52
Unlike the CBD, only sixty-eight countries have signed onto the Nagoya Protocol.53
There are three obligations each participating state must meet: (1) access to genetic
resources, (2) benefit-sharing, and (3) compliance.54 Each obligation has its own
rules for nations to follow.55 Most countries that have agreed to the CBD also have
agreed to the Nagoya Protocol.56
To gain access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge,57 collectors must
obtain prior informed consent from the community or indigenous tribe, and both

50
Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts
with Global Patent Policies, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 433, 473 (2006).
51

List of Parties, supra note 27. See Lessons from Bioprospecting in India and Nigeria,
CULTURAL
SURVIVAL
(2000),
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/lessons-bioprospecting-india-andnigeria (demonstrating that India, for example started the Tropical Botanic Garden and
Research Institute (TBGRI) which helped collaborated with the Kani tribe and started a profit
sharing program of fifty percent of the licensing fee and two percent royalty on profits).
TBGRI knew it did not reach out to all of the members, so they put the profits in a trust. Id.
The Kani tribe continues to profit from the agreement with the TBGRI. Id. Due to the CBD
the Kani tribe is allowed to deny such activity today if it wants. Id.
52

Matthias Buck & Clare Hamilton, The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to
the Convention on Biological Diversity, 20 RECIEL 47, 47 (2011); see also Vanessa Danley,
Biopiracy in the Brazilian Amazon: Learning from International and Comparative Law
Successes and Shortcomings to Help Promote Biodiversity Conservation in Brazil, 7 FLA. A &
M UNIV. L. REV. 2, 302 (2012) (“The Nagoya Protocol’s main goal is to ensure that the parties
to the agreement are adopting the benefit-sharing provision of the CBD.”).
53

List of Parties, supra note 27.

54

About the Nayoga Protocol, CBD, https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/default.shtml/ (last
visited Oct. 15, 2015).
55

Id.

56

Dr. Konstantia Koutouki & Katharina Rogalla von Bieberstein, The Nagoya Protocol:
Sustainable Access and Benefits-Sharing for Indigenous and Local Communities, 13 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 513, 528-29 (2012). The United States has not agreed to the Nagoya Protocol.
57

See
Traditional
Knowledge
Innovations
and
Practice,
CBD,
https://www.cbd.int/traditional/intro.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (“Traditional
knowledge refers to the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities around the world. Developed from experience gained over the centuries and
adapted to the local culture and environment, traditional knowledge is transmitted orally from
generation to generation.”).
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parties must agree on the established terms. 58 How that consent is handled is
undefined.59 It is up to the individual nations or parties to legislate accordingly.60
There are precautions in place to help the traditional knowledge holders or
indigenous tribes; such precautions include understanding the bioprospector’s
proposition or that a community has the right to say “no.”61 The communities also
must agree upon benefit sharing.62 Not all the words within the Nagoya Protocol are
defined.63 For example, utilization is not defined, which could be a weak point in the
protocol.64 But each country’s ability to make its own rules, following the framework
of Nagoya, can define the extra terms and change laws that are not having the
intended effect.65 Bioprospecting legislation should be analyzed annually to see if the
legislation has the intended effect.66
The last step a nation must take is to make sure bioprospectors are complying
with the country’s regulations for gathering genetic resources and traditional
knowledge.67 Regulations include upholding contracts, PIC, and settling any
contractual violations or changes a party may want to make to the contract.68
Nagoya added extra precautions to protect indigenous and local communities.69
Nagoya’s additional protections were a significant step in developing international
biodiversity policy.70 However, a weakness of Nagoya lies within its enforcement
mechanisms; enforcement depends on any given nation’s willingness to act on it.71
This leaves communities and nations vulnerable to exploitation by bioprospectors,
especially when a nation does not hold the indigenous group in high regard or when
there is a lack of enforcement due to a lack of resources.72 Nevertheless, the Nagoya
58

Buck & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 54.

59

See id.

60

Id.

61

Id.; see also About the Nayoga Protocol, supra note 54.

62

Buck & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 55.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Jorge Cabrera Medaglia et al., The Interface Between the Nagoya Protocol on ABS and
the ITPGRFA at the International Level: Potential Issues for Consideration in Supporting
Mutually Supporting Implementation at the National Level, FNI REPORT (2013),
http://www.fni.no/pdf/FNI-R0113.pdf.
66
See Jane Maienschein et al., Articles, Biology and Law: Challenges of Adjudicating
Competing Claims in a Democracy, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 151, 156 (1998) (“[S]cientific
knowledge can change rapidly, which can be a problem for legal and political processes . . .
the process of doing science creates a changeable set of specific evidentiary claims.”).
67

About the Nayoga Protocol, supra note 54.

68

Id.

69

Buck & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 54.

70

Id. at 60; see also Koutouki & Rogalla von Bieberstein, supra note 56, at 535.

71

Koutouki & Rogalla von Bieberstein, supra note 56, at 531.

72

Id. at 531.
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Protocol is promising because it overcomes differences in global environmental
politics, showing a strong effort for regrowth in not only nature but relations as
well.73
C. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
The U.S. has decided to use TRIPS instead of the CBD because of its focus on
the patenting of new biotechnology discoveries.74 The U.S. has many companies that
are focused on biotechnologies. The prevalence of biotechnology companies
strengthens the economy and, therefore, is important to policymakers.75 RIPS
globally recognizes different patents and requires all participating nations to
recognize patent rights of genetic and plant resources.76 Primarily, developing
countries have attempted to put limits on how material for the patents can be
acquired.77 However, the U.S. and foreign developing countries do not agree so long
as they follow the patent process for the country.78 The U.S. has continued to favor
TRIPS due to its prioritization of intellectual property rights.79
TRIPS currently requires countries to issue patents for a patentable product.80
The requirement for patents holds true even if the patentable product violated access
rules of the country, so long as they “involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application.”81 This shows that countries that prioritize the TRIPS
agreement over the CBD are not concerned about indigenous peoples’ rights or the
need to address the mass biodiversity loss. Rather, such countries are more
concerned about patents and commercial innovation based on resources that may
have been obtained through unethical means, such as not fully disclosing the extent
to which corporations may take from the land or finding loopholes to benefit sharing
contracts, which are extremely difficult to enforce.82 Innovation in the U.S. has
73

Buck & Hamilton, supra note 52, at 61.

74

Grebe, supra note 43, at 369.

75

See Mark Terry, In Public-Private Deal, New York State Invests $225 Million and
Athenex Invests $1.62 Billion to Create 1,400 Jobs, BIOSPACE (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://www.biospace.com/News/in-public-private-deal-new-york-state-invests225/408642?intcid=homepage-seekercarousel-featurednews-navindex1 (“We have been
incredibly impressed by Governor Cuomo’s leadership to attract significant new jobs within
New York State . . . [h]is commitment to economic development has successfully permeated
an impressive ‘Open for Business’ culture we have not see [sic] anywhere else.”).
76

Grebe, supra note 43, at 384.

77

Safrin, supra note 40, at 666-67.

78

Id. at 667.

79

See generally Grebe, supra note 43.

80

Safrin, supra note 40, at 667.

81

Id.

82

See Nicola Lucchi, Understanding Genetic Information as a Commons: From
Bioprospecting to Personalized Medicine, 7 INT’L J. COMMONS 313, 332 (2013) (“‘Patent
protection is . . . a two-edged sword.’ On one side, ‘the promise of exclusive rights provides
monetary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery.’ On the other side, ‘that
very exclusivity can impeded the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur,
invention.’”).
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always been favored, especially since it is closely associated with “the American
Dream” mentality.83 Thus, not regulating bioprospecting gives corporations room for
innovation and exploitation of both goods and people without consequences.
TRIPS sets forth guidelines for individuals filing patents, and each country
models its own set of rules to meet its needs.84 Each country’s provisions must fall
within three categories: (1) intellectual standards, (2) domestic enforcement, and (3)
settle disputes amongst its members.85 TRIPS binds nations with only its minimum
standard requirements, ignoring the requirements of the CBD, so the only way to
incorporate the two is either have the WTO incorporate the CBD or have each
individual country make the CBD a part of its patent filing processes.86 However,
the main reason countries like the U.S. prefer the TRIPS agreement is due to the
loose standards and enforcement policies for when a dispute occurs between
countries.87 If an inventor wants a patent approved in a country, the inventor must
file it according to that country’s specifications.88 The U.S. is no different.89 The
TRIPS agreement is not bulletproof because developing countries have been copying
other countries’ patents.90 For example, Brazil copies pharmaceutical patents.91
Authors have already suggested incorporating PIC into the U.S. TRIPS patent
process. Even though naturally-occurring resources cannot be patented, which
includes traditional knowledge, “TRIPS effectively allows biopiracy to occur, since
products of nature are not protected by TRIPS.”92 Scientists can extract the material
from a natural substance and turn it into a medical advancement, changing the
naturally occurring material into a profitable patent.93 For example, if PIC was
included under TRIPS and applied to all possible afflicted parties, not limited to
national governments, it could be the gateway into granting property rights to
citizens and traditional knowledge benefits to indigenous groups.94 Even though the

83

Safrin, supra note 40, at 674.

84
Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman’s Hut to the Patent Office: In Search of a
TRIPS-Consistent Requirement to Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior
Informed Consent, 17 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 111, 125-26 (2005).
85
Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm.
86

Carvalho, supra note 84, at 128.

87

See id. at 186.

88

See id. at 126.

89

See id.

ORGANIZATION

(2016),

90

See Erik B. Bluemel, Substance Without Process: Analyzing TRIPS Participatory
Guarantees in Light of Protected Indigenous Rights, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
671, 686-87 (2004) [hereinafter Bluemel, Substance Without Process].
91

See Carolyn S. Corn, Pharmaceutical Patents in Brazil: Is Compulsory Licensing the
Solution?, 9 B.U. INT’L L.J. 71, 71-75 (1991).
92

Bluemel, Substance Without Process, supra note 90, at 684-86.

93

See id. at 686.

94

Id. at 694-95.
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U.S. does not allow for substances occurring in nature not to be patented in that
form,95 this does not mean other nations follow the same guidelines.96
Although PIC is mentioned under TRIPS, the protocol is not required in the
agreement and, therefore, is not necessary for enforcement unless the rules from the
country require it.97 Since PIC is not within the agreement part of TRIPS, the U.S. is
not required to incorporate it into its patent legislation and has not required it yet.98
The U.S failure to require PIC has the consequence of allowing biopiracy findings—
microorganisms or active chemical ingredients with highly profitable potential
retrieved through exploiting land or traditional knowledge of an indigenous tribe—to
be eligible patent material within the U.S.99 Also, if one of the following regulations
does not function properly, a researcher may bioprospect on public grounds in the
U.S., making all public land open to exploitation.
D. U.S. Bioprospecting Legislation and Precedent
The U.S. has taken some action concerning bioprospecting legislation. The
earliest U.S. action was the case of Edmonds Institute v. Babbit, in which
Yellowstone National Park initially tried to implement the first bioprospecting
agreement within its park.100 Hawaii and Utah have also enacted, or attempted to
enact, legislation to help regulate bioprospecting on public grounds.101 Below are
descriptions of such actions.102
1. Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt and National Park Regulation
Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt is the only case to establish precedent for
bioprospecting in the U.S. National Parks.103 In 1999, plaintiffs first brought the case
challenging the Department of the Interior’s authority to enter into a commercial
bioprospecting agreement with Diversa Corporation (Diversa)104 at Yellowstone
95
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (“Congress thus recognized
that the relevant distinction was . . . between products of nature, whether living or not, and
human-made inventions.”).
96

See Bluemel, Substance Without Process, supra note 90, at 686.

97

Id. at 693-94.

98

Grebe, supra note 43, at 389-90; see also Chen, supra note 9, at 10639.

99

Grebe, supra note 43, at 389-90.

100

Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

101
Eric Goldman, Utah Passes Nation’s First (?) Bioprospecting Regulation, TECH. AND
MARKETING
L.
BLOG
(Mar.
10,
2010),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/03/utah_passes_nat.htm.
102

See infra notes 106-81.

103

Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 9.

104

See id. at 2. Diversa Corporation is a San Diego based biotechnology company. The
plaintiffs in the case were Edmonds Institute (a nonprofit public interest organization),
Alliance for the Wild Rockies (a nonprofit organization to preserve native biodiversity),
International Center for Technology Assessment (a nonprofit organization focused on the
ethical issues in the biotechnology industry), and Phil Knight, a resident of Bozeman,
Montana. Id. at 9.
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National Park.105 The Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA)
was the first bioprospecting legislation entered into on behalf of the parks.106 Prior to
CRADA, park services received no benefit from any derivative park products.107 The
Yellowstone-Diversa CRADA included benefit-sharing practices and revenues if
Diversa commercially benefited from any research deriving from the
microorganisms collected from Yellowstone.108 Also, Diversa agreed to make annual
payments of around $20,000 to Park Services and provide research equipment for the
park to use.109
Prior to CRADA, any researcher could remove specimen from the park with a
permit and develop it if he or she wished.110 Yellowstone already has examples of
unique genetic material with commercial application, such as thermos aquaticus, a
heat-resistant bacterium.111 The environmental impact assessment is especially
important because of the potential to exploit natural resources for commercial
gain.112 A court makes the distinction between commercial and research activity in
stating that, “There is an undeniable reality that commercial activity is qualitatively
different than scientific and educational activity of a similar nature, due to the very
different forces and motivations that drive them.”113 Due to the profitable nature of
bioprospecting, exploitation is bound to happen unless there are safeguards in place

105

Id. at 4.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 5. Yellowstone has had commercial derivative products, such as the Taq
polymerase, that are profitable. Id. The Taq polymerase patent sold for an estimated $300
million and generates about $100 million a year. Id. The current patent holder offered to
contribute to the park; however, Yellowstone denied because it was uncertain about the
legality of the transaction. Id.
108

Id. at 2-3, 5 (“The Park has indicated that it will receive royalties of between .5% and
10% depending upon the nature of the raw material and the final product.”).
109

Id. at 5.

110

Todd Weaver, Bioprospecting in the National Parks: Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt, 42
JURIMETRICS J. 61, 67 (2001).
111
Safrin, supra note 40, at 682 (citing Adair, supra note 2, at 141); see also Chelsea
DeWeese, Mysterious Microbes: How Yellowstone’s Thermophiles Affect All of Us,
YELLOWSTONE Q. (Spring 2015).
112

See Aseff, supra note 2, at 201-02 (“Protected public land and natural resources
provide raw material for the bioprospectors, while patent law opens the door for commercial
exploitation, inevitably raising concerns about line drawing and the ‘Tragedy of the
Commons’ dilemma.”).
113

Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 13; see also Lonie R. Boens, Note, Edmonds Institute
v. Babbitt: Bioprospecting on Federal Lands, Public Loss or Public Gain?, 4 GREAT PLAINS
NAT. RESOURCES J. 50, 58 (1999) (“The commercial component of bioprospecting is driven by
self-interest profit incentives which have the potential to overshadow the more altruistic
conservation component of the industry. The lure of extensive profits subjects bioprospecting
to abuse.”).
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prior.114 Thankfully, the National Park Service has such protection through
legislation.115
The Edmonds court defined bioprospecting as “a relatively new method of
natural resource exploitation . . . that targets microscopic resources—the genetic and
biochemical information found in wild plants, animals, and microorganisms.”116 This
is a very narrow definition, and even though the court alluded to the fundamental
understanding of “timber harvesting, mining, hunting, and grazing,”117 it purposely
did not include it because those activities are using the materials themselves as the
commercial gains and not the scientifically-derived material.118 The court also
pointed to the lack of a definitive policy statement of bioprospecting through
regulations or less formal means.119
In Edmonds, the plaintiffs brought suit because the National Park Service failed
to provide public notice of the changes brought by the agreement and did not
perform an environmental impact assessment of the agreement, which is required by
law.120 The plaintiffs alleged that human intrusion around features like the thermal
geysers disrupted the aesthetic enjoyment of the park.121 Plaintiffs also alleged the
Park Service violated the Federal Technology Transfer Act (FTTA), the National
Park Service Organic Act (NPSOA), the Yellowstone National Park Organic Act
(YOA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the public trust
doctrine.122 The court only decided that the plaintiffs proved the agreement between
Diversa and Yellowstone was against public interest of the Park and that the
Yellowstone-Diversa CRADA would be suspended on completion of an
environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement.123
The D.C. District Court heard Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt again, deciding whether
the Department of the Interior’s “entry into a research agreement with a private
biotechnology company for the ‘bioprospecting’ of microbial organisms from . . .

114

See Aseff, supra note 2, at 190, 201.

115
The National Park Service Organic Act provides that the purposed of the parks are “to
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein . . . by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” 54 U.S.C. §
100101 (2016) et. seq; see also Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 93 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69-70 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
116

Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d. at 6.

117

Id. at 5-6.

118

Id. at 11-12 (“[D]efendants concede, the collection of microbial samples, while not
rising to the level of strip mining or timber harvesting, does involve some intrusion into
delicate ecosystems around Yellowstone’s thermal features.”).
119

Id. at 9.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 11-12.

122

Weaver, supra note 110, at 62.

123

See Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. at 20; see also Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jenson, 108
F.3d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ommercial fishing is statutorily prohibited only in the
Park’s designated wilderness areas.”).
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Yellowstone” was arbitrary and capricious.124 The arbitrary and capricious standard
is “‘highly deferential’ and presumes the validity of agency action.”125 When
construing the language of the statutes in question, the court stated, “CRADA is
consistent with Congressional intent regarding cooperative scientific research
agreements with units of the National Park System.”126
The court wrote that CRADA was not against the intent of the statute because the
“‘commercial use’ flowing from such research is limited to applications or products
generated from the scientific study of the resources, not the resources themselves.”127
The court also recognized a park’s ability to construe the regulations to meet the
park’s own requirements.128 Even the Solicitor recommended the essence of CRADA
be placed within the permit process for research itself in order to help regulate the
commercial benefits from products derived as a result of research throughout the
National Park System.129 This addition would remove the arbitrary and capricious
standard so long as Park System gives equal opportunity for organizations to apply
for the CRADA after they have applied for a permit. Because only approximately
forty to fifty of the research permits are for microbial research, the CRADA
agreements would be less than or equal to the amount of permits for a given year.130
Both of the Edmonds decisions provide parks the flexibility to engage in
potential commercial benefits of the parks, but the cases set precedent that the
researchers or companies cannot obtain profits from harvesting or mining the raw
material.131 If the profits came from “the resources themselves,”132 then the plaintiffs
would have won due to the prioritization of protecting the parks and the biodiversity
within them. The profit from the microbial samples come from the research and the
genetically modified results from the samples, unlike timber and mineral extraction
where the organic resources are the goods themselves.133
These cases are important because of the financial benefits involved in the
CRADA Act, providing the parks financial benefits and resources.134 National Parks
124

Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 93 F. Supp. 2d 63, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

125

Id. at 67 (quoting United Transp. Union v. Lewis, 711 F.2d 233, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

126

Id. at 68.

127

Id. at 72.

128

Id.; see Weaver, supra note 110, at 71-72.

129

See Edmonds Inst. v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Any specimen
collected under this permit . . . may not be used for commercial purposes unless the permittee
has entered into a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) with the
[relevant agency of the Department of Interior].”) (quoting Pls.’ Reply Brief, Ex. 1).
130

Id. at 7.

131

See Adair, supra note 2 at 131 (discussing the benefits of the U.S. resources in the field
of biotechnology and if they should be used).
132

Edmonds Inst., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 72.

133

See Aseff, supra note 2, at 201 (“[N]on-naturally occurring organisms . . . are
patentable . . . Under current U.S. law, genetically modified organisms obtained through
bioprospecting are patentable.”).
134

Edmonds Inst., 42 F. Supp. 2d at 5.
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have the potential to benefit greatly from the agreement, providing Yellowstone up
to ten percent (10%) of future profits Diversa might make from bioprospecting
profits.135 Yellowstone has lawfully issued permits to companies, and the park
continues to issue permits to this day.136
2. Utah
Utah is the first state to pass bioprospecting legislation after Edmonds Institute v.
Babbitt, and the laws passed with almost no opposition within the state’s
legislature.137 The only other state to attempt to pass bioprospecting legislation is
Hawaii, but the legislation failed due to relations with Hawaii’s indigenous
population, addressed below.138 Unlike Hawaii, Utah went for a more economic tone
while attempting to adapt to the CBD.139 Utah requires registration prior to
bioprospecting.140 The state defines bioprospecting as “the removal from a natural
environment for research or commercial use of naturally occurring microorganism,
plant or fungus, or information concerning a naturally occurring microorganism’s,
plant’s, or fungus’ physical or genetic properties.”141 The definition encompasses
more than the D.C. District Court’s definition in Edmonds or Hawaii’s definition,
and this shows Utah’s ability to incorporate the international views of bioprospecting
into its statute. Keeping the definition broad and the statute vague or “skeletal”
allows for the Act to be molded so that it may be more effective in the future.142
Another key difference between Utah and Hawaii is that Utah has far fewer
indigenous people.143 The bill was enacted stating that Utah owned its resources and
not the people.144 Thus, companies have to enter into a contract with Utah and not
with individual parties.145 Utah’s approach has worked for some CBD nations, as
well.146 Because companies must set terms with the state, Utah can enforce “criminal
135

Id.

136

See DeWeese, supra note 111, at 12-13.

137
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 65A-14-101, 201, 202, 301 (2016); see also William M. Fischer,
The Utah Bioprospecting Act of 2010: (Unintentional) State-Level Implementation of the
United Nations Convention on Biodiversity, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 197, 200
(2012).
138

See Fischer, supra note 137, at 205-06. See generally A NATION RISING: HAWAII
MOVEMENTS FOR LIFE, LAND, AND SOVEREIGNTY (Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua et al. eds.,
2014).
139

See Fischer, supra note 137, at 199-201.

140

Id. at 201.

141

Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-102 (2016)).

142

Id. at 202.

143

See id. at 205.

144

See id. at 202.

145

See id. at 201.

146

Like Utah, Brazil also requires that bioprospectors negotiate directly with the country,
instead of individual parties. Brazil also requests that all of the activities involving genetic
information and the traditional knowledge be recorded. Further, Brazil has enacted penalties
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penalties, including payment of restitution, ‘proportional to the economic interests
the state may have under [the Act].’”147 Through enforcing risks, Utah has the ability
to regulate the bioprospectors and offers a means to deter individual companies from
breaking their contracts.
Utah regulates and implements its legislation through its administrative rulemaking body, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR).148 For a company to
have access to Utah’s resources, the company must first register with the state.149
After registration, a license is granted, and the parties have to enter a contract with
Utah.150 Once granted, bioprospectors must provide information concerning the
activity and the sites on which parties plan to bioprospect.151 The license is valid for
twelve months and can be renewed after the period expires.152
Utah’s DNR would discuss the royalty programs derived from bioprospecting
through “good faith negotiations.”153 The state would receive any benefits a company
may produce from future bioprospecting products or receive royalties from the
extraction of such goods, like oil around the Salt Lake.154
Authors have pointed out that the bill’s vagueness could have a detrimental effect
on protecting the biodiversity of the land itself, calling for a more concrete set of
rules.155 However, because it is the first bill of its time, vagueness might come in
handy, especially because the overall objectives of the bill are set forth both in the
legislative history and the original purpose in the bill. Critics argue that the bill was
poorly drafted and question Utah’s ability to regulate without clear and convincing
guidelines.156 However, ambiguity in the law allows Utah to test different approaches
to see what works, and although the bill enacts the state’s rights within
bioprospecting, there is room to address private property rights, which could be a job
for future legislation.157 Utah is taking steps in the right direction and sets a

to protect this information. See Stephen Jenei, Brazilian Government Published Bill on
Bioprospecting/Biopiracy,
PATENT
BARISTAS
(Feb.
15,
2008),
http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2008/02/15/brazilian-government-published-bill-onbioprospectingbiopiracy/.
147

Fischer, supra note 137, at 201 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-301 (2016)).

148

See id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-104 (2016)); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 652-150
(2011).
149

See Fischer, supra note 137, at 201.

150

See id.

151

See id.

152

See id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-201 (2016)).

153

Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-14-202 (2016)).

154
See id. at 201-02. Due to the extreme habitats of the state, “research showed that
organisms unique to Utah had great potential for profitable products and processes.” Id. at
203.
155

See id. at 222.

156

See Goldman, supra note 101.

157

See Fischer, supra note 137, at 217, 222; see also Bang, supra note 23, at 74.
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framework that other states can copy to include bioprospecting rights on their own
soil.
3.

Hawaii

Hawaii has a lot to offer bioprospectors, including its wealth of traditional
knowledge, unique biodiversity, and promotion of the biotechnological sector.158 But
because of its rich information and history, Hawaii should be worried about the
stripping of these resources for any biotechnological advances that may be in high
demand. Hawaii attempted to enact its own laws to protect against bioprospecting
and the “tremendous loss of biodiversity.”159 Hawaii’s Constitution provides that
“[a]ll public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the
people,”160 so through this language, Hawaii attempted to put its resources in a trust
for the state.161 However, Hawaii’s solution in creating a public trust ignores the
private interest of the people indigenous to Hawaii who have a special connection to
the state’s land and resources.162
In its draft legislation, Hawaii defined bioprospecting as “the collection, removal,
or use of biological and genetic resources of any organism, mineral, or other organic
substance found within the public lands of the State and the state marine waters for
scientific research or commercial development.”163 Hawaii attempted to functionally
adopt the CBD’s guidelines and rules by making it a part of its new legislation.164
Hawaiian indigenous people make up twenty-three percent (23%) of the
population.165 The indigenous people have a significant amount of knowledge and a
history with the land.166 The legislature has had some problems in the past deciding
whether to give native Hawaiians special rights and protection when it comes to the
patentability and extracting of resources and use of their traditional knowledge.167
The indigenous population of Hawaii should be wary of bioprospecting because it
“has harmed many of the estimated 300 million indigenous people worldwide.”168

158

See Sarah K. Kam, Comment, Biopiracy in Paradise?: Fulfilling the Legal Duty to
Regulate Bioprospecting in Hawai’i, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 387, 388 (2006).
159

S.B. 151, 24th Leg, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2007).

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

“Bioprospecting has adversely affected environments and indigenous peoples
throughout the world, including the extinction of natural species and the unauthorized
appropriation of traditional knowledge.” Kam, supra note 158, at 388.
163

Haw. S.B. 151.

164

Fischer, supra note 137, at 199-200.

165

Sara K. Goo, After 200 Years, Native Hawaiians Make a Comeback, PEW RESEARCH
CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/06/native-hawaiian-population/ (last
visited Sept. 22, 2016).
166

Id.

167

Kam, supra note 158, at 399.

168

Id. at 397.
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Through these problems and the loose interpretation of the CBD, Hawaii has had
trouble enacting any proactive legislation to help establish rights within the state.169
In its enactment, Hawaii’s legislation faced more difficulties than Utah’s because
the Hawaiian legislation could not only focus on the economic benefits like
Utah’s.170 Hawaii must focus more on the preservation of biodiversity and traditional
knowledge of native Hawaiians when enacting bioprospecting legislation.171 Hawaii
has different values for bioprospecting legislation, which can make enacting and
enforcing the legislation much more difficult compared to Utah’s plan above.172
Hawaii’s history and cultural diversity make it more difficult to agree on how to
protect the biodiversity and knowledge of the land.173
However, Hawaii did not fail completely. In 2009, Hawaii started and continues
to limit activity in the Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument.174 In order
to manage and minimize human impact, the state initiated a permitting program,
requiring all activities in the Monument (with limited exceptions) to obtain a
permit.175 This small step shows Hawaii’s commitment to preserving its
biodiversity.176 Indeed, this prohibition of bioprospecting without a permit in the
Monument shows the state’s commitment.177 However, this legislation only protects

169

Fischer, supra note 137, at 199-200 (“The Hawaiian statute failed, in part due to its
lack of efficiently stringent benefits-sharing arrangements with the Hawaiian people.”).
170

Id.

171

Id. at 212.

172

Id. at 225. Hawaii’s interest to protect Native Hawaiian rights and knowledge is a state
constitutional value. But there is disconnect between Native Hawaiians and the rest of the
population. See Kenneth R. Conklin, Kahana Valley Giveaway—Just More of the Same, HAW.
REP. (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.angelfire.com/big09a/KahanaGiveawayToEvilEmpire.html.
173

See generally NOELANI GOODYEAR-KA’OPUA, A NATION RISING: HAWAIIAN
MOVEMENTS FOR LIFE, LAND AND SOVEREIGNTY (2014). Hawaii’s struggle between indigenous
rights and public domain or public resources, shows the tension with which most international
bioprospecting legislation has struggled. Indigenous people have known properties of certain
organic material for hundreds of years while companies now are trying to figure out ways of
extracting the those properties and commercializing them. See, e.g., Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Doman, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (2004).
174
Resource Protection, PAPAHANAUMOKUAKEA MARINE NAT’L
http://www.papahanaumokuakea.gov/resource/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
175

Permitting,
PAPAHANAUMOKUAKEA
MARINE
NAT’L
http://www.papahanaumokuakea.gov/permit/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
176

MONUMENT,
MONUMENT,

Id.

177

See Aseff, supra note 2, at 189-90. This does not mean that research in the area has
stopped. Four new species of deep-water algae recently were found and sampled between
2013-2015. See News and Events: New Algae Species Discovered in Hawaii’s Deep Waters,
MARINE
NAT’L
MONUMENT,
PAPAHANAUMOKUAKEA
http://www.papahanaumokuakea.gov/news/new_species_algae.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2016).
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the northwest Hawaiian islands and does not protect the rest of Hawaii from the
possible effects of bioprospecting.178
III. ANALYSIS
The U.S. would have much to gain through bioprospecting legislation. It is one
of the biggest nations in world with varying climates, from arctic conditions in
Alaska to tropical temperatutres in Hawaii and Florida. The U.S. also has reserved a
lot of land for federal parks, started by Theodore Roosevelt to help preserve the
nation’s lands.179 The National Park Service manages 79.6 million acres over 58
national parks, with the largest being Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and Preserve
in Alaska covering 13.2 million acres and the smallest being Thaddeus Kosciuszko
National Memorial in Pennsylvania covering 0.02 acres.180 The parks receive over
292 million visitors every year,181 showing that they are a national treasure and
should be preserved.
There are two distinct, overarching concerns throughout bioprospecting
regulation literature. First, bioprospecting needs to be regulated to protect
biodiversity182 Second, we must make sure indigenous people’s rights and
knowledge are protected.183 The common denominator and threat in both of these
aspects is commercialization and capitalism and how they can corrupt the indigenous
peoples and the ecosystem.184 Due to the potential profitability of these resources,
companies are going to want access to ecosystems that could be biotechnological
gold.185
After looking at all the options that states and the federal government have—and
have not—taken to protect against bioprospecting, it is difficult to assemble a
coherent structure that includes the nurturing nature of the CBD and the patentability
aspirations of the WTO while respecting federal and state rights. A common thought
throughout the literature, on both an international and national scale, is for the U.S.

178

See Andrea Aseff, Hooray for No Bioprospecting in the NWHI!, KAHEA BLOG (Jun.
24 2009, 6:52 PM), http://kahea.org/blog/hooray-for-no-bioprospecting-in-the-nwhi.
179

Ross W. Gorte et al., Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV. (Feb. 8, 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf.
180
Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/faqs.htm
(last visited Dec. 4, 2015).
181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Traditional knowledge in the United States is not in danger because the natural resource
itself cannot be patentable. However, the knowledge could expedite the patent process if
researchers use it in attempts to extract and remake a chemical that can lead to a new drug or
technology. See David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could be a Tool to Protect
Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253 (2000).
184

Id.

185

See id. at 254-55 (“Traditional knowledge has been used in many industries as a
starting point for new product development, in sectors such as specialty food, beverages,
pharmaceuticals, agriculture, horticulture, and personal care and cosmetics; and it remains a
significant resource for many commercial research and development programs.”).
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to include prior informed consent as a part of the patentability process.186 But that
still does not address the argument of who owns the biological material, which is
where Congress’s original concern of property rights comes into play.187
One of the main focuses for federal legislation is that it must incorporate the
CBD ethics into the TRIPS process, which would allow the U.S. to focus on
patentability and innovation through the WTO lens.188 The U.S. has stood by the
TRIPS agreement, and any deviation would go against the pro-corporation mentality
for the prioritization of the patent process.189 This is consistent with the American
dream and fostering creativity and innovation of which the U.S. is a leader.190
Because the TRIPS recommends incorporating PIC into a country’s regulations for
the patent process, the U.S. could easily alter its patent process to match the
protocol. It would be more beneficial, though, for the WTO to amend its rules;
however, the implementing body, the Council of TRIPS committee, has no authority
to do so.191 Thus, countries that have not ratified the CBD have no incentive, other
than good will, to incorporate this extra step in their patent processes, which would
make the U.S. patent process more burdensome.
Without patents requiring disclosure of the genetic material or PIC, the U.S.
patent process is incomplete when compared to other countries.192 By not specifically
requesting the location an organic material was found, the process is negligent to the
fact that materials could be found in a different place. Because there are multiple
areas on the globe that could potentially have the ecosystem to support the microbial
material, companies could make false claims on their applications. Further, there is
no way to quickly and adequately test the legitimacy of where a microbial was
found, especially when each sample is random and there is no guarantee of finding
the same microbial needed for reproducing the genetic material from which the
patent was derived.193 Also, the time and resources it would take to confirm the
patent application are costly and counterintuitive.194
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Even though there are possible ways get around this potential requirement in the
patent process, the requirement could nevertheless be beneficial. If the results are
not completely accurate, the data derived from such legislation would allow an
administrative body to track where potential profitable biodiversity is located.195
Through the data, the U.S. would be able to protect areas susceptible to
bioprospecting more adequately.
The U.S. patent process does require that the information on the material, like
general location, be disclosed within the patent process, along with a detailed
explanation of the patent itself, including how to make it.196 A PIC would not be hard
to implement under the U.S. patent process, and most researchers and companies
would not have a problem enacting it, especially if corporations already had
agreements, like CRADA between Yellowstone and Diversa.197 However,
bioprospecting on private lands or with indigenous people would require more time
and resources.198 The PIC is the easiest way to instill protection and more regulation
of the areas where bioprospectors are collecting the information.
In theory, however, once an organism is extracted from an area, additional
samples of the same resource should not be needed, especially since the patentable
material needs to be a product of human innovation and not nature.199 Changing
patent regulation is not enough because that still does not regulate bioprospecting on
public lands without other regulations to help aid the process.200 But not all
biotechnology companies have the same access to the same microbial material,
especially in areas where permits are required, such as Yellowstone and the
Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument.201 Plus, certain companies may
have an advantage over their competitors. For example, arguably Diversa, through
the CRADA agreement with Yellowstone, has an advantage over competitors even
though the agreement took eight years after the environmental impact assessment.202
With biotechnology’s profitability potential, companies want to invest in research
and development.203 Legislation and a more comprehensive program to combat
bioprospecting can only help. Not only should the federal government regulate all
national parks and monuments, but each individual state also should set up
requirements to help regulate bioprospecting, like Utah.
195
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One of the benefits for states or the federal government in enacting
bioprospecting legislation is the possible economic benefit, such as those on which
Utah’s legislation focused.204 Biotechnological advances potentially can be a billion
dollar investment for a state.205 But greed also could be a motivating factor behind
Utah’s legislation. Further, Utah only addresses public lands.206 If states or the
federal government are only worried about the potential commercial benefit, they
may overlook the reason why most bioprospecting bills are passed in the first
place—to protect biodiversity loss and traditional knowledge for everyday uses.
If the U.S. enacted a similar bill, it would only protect its lands and people and
set the standard for U.S. corporations and their bioprospecting practices in other
parts of the world. This isolated effect is especially true because the U.S. did not
sign either the CBD or the Kyoto agreement.207 The U.S. government purposely does
not ratify certain agreements, so it has an excuse not to be held accountable.208 Even
if other nations put pressure on the U.S., the U.S. government does not bend to the
international community.209 This shows a lack of leadership on environmental issues,
especially when the U.S. has the potential to impact those issues.210
Because the U.S. did not sign the CBD or Kyoto agreement, the U.S. government
has free reign to enact legislation how it sees fit, which may be a reason why no
comprehensive, federal legislation has been enacted.211 Due to this inaction, states
like Utah and Hawaii have taken the initiative to help protect their resources from
the biotechnical world even though each state has enacted different forms of such
legislation.212 Utah established a comprehensive framework that is still pretty new
and vague.213 Although Fischer, a critical scholar on the topic, calls for open debate
and policy initiatives, there are clear strategies that the U.S. should have already
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incorporated into its federal policy and requested that states follow with assisting
legislation for the protection of biodiversity.214
If the federal government continues to remain inactive on this question, states
should protect themselves and their resources. Utah took steps to make this a reality,
and Hawaii has desperately tried to come up with a balance between native
Hawaiians’ rights and the rights of rest of its population.215 Each state should tailor
its bioprospecting laws on the state’s individual needs. The need for bioprospecting
in Alaska, which is rich in arctic biodiversity, would be different than the needs in a
more commercially developed state like New York.216
The drawback would be that each state would need to enact its own regulation,
which may not be a priority for the state’s legislature, especially since it is not a
federal priority. Even though companies would have to follow the individual rules of
each state, if the states follow a contract formula for private and state actors, the
varying pieces of legislation among the states would incorporate a well-known area
of law with the new rules and regulations of bioprospecting.217 Even though a
comprehensive federal plan may be easier, companies doing business in multiple
states already have to adapt themselves to the needs of individual states.218 Plus, if
they are investing money into the research and development of a microorganism for
potential profits, they can surely invest in a lawyer.
However, a comprehensive federal framework could create regulations that
would easily transfer from state to state. All states would have to do is ratify or adopt
the federal legislation. The dilemma between federal and state action only calls for a
“continued emphasis on piecemeal bioprospecting diverts attention from more
valuable remedies for the biodiversity crisis.”219 Even though both are possible
options, the reality is that something should be done about bioprospecting. Other
countries that have bioprospecting frameworks are also part of the CBD, putting the
U.S. in a league of its own for creating and enforcing its laws.220 Federal and most
state governments have still not answered Congress’s problems and aspects about
bioprospecting.221
There has been little conversation in the U.S. as to protecting indigenous tribes’
rights and traditional knowledge when it comes to bioprospecting, as well as
identifying personal property rights, which is a fundamental right.222 Property owners
214
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with a vast amount of acreage would benefit from PIC and the opportunity to receive
economic benefits from biotech companies, like in Utah the system has initiated.223
Contract law could help bridge the knowledge gap between indigenous and private
owners’ cooperation with biotechnical companies.224 A contract between the
bioprospectors and the landowners (either private parties or indigenous groups)
would help enforce the rights of the landowners and provide protection against the
bioprospecting actions varying from the agreement.225 The indigenous tribes or
private property owners would have grounds for legal action if a part of the contract
was not followed or not included within the contract, which could also bring
economic compensation for use of their land.226
The downside to bringing contract theory into the bioprospecting debate is the
lack of knowledge concerning the contracts and certain loopholes corporate
attorneys may draft to exploit the other party. However, unless heavily incentivized,
the more legal jargon written into a contract for land use, the wearier a person will be
to sign the contract due to the binding nature of the legal document. Plus, clauses
that would allow an indigenous tribe or individuals to cancel the contract if they are
unhappy with a bioprospector’s actions can potentially rectify the issue of
corporations using the contract for exploitation of the land.
The other problem, other than rights to the land, is rights to the information that
indigenous communities have known and have passed down for generations. Most of
the literature suggests that indigenous tribes should be compensated for their
knowledge and the resources their lands provide.227 Although the literature provides
helpful recommendations, the suggestions fail to consider that those communities
need protection from the outside world. Even though indigenous communities keep
to themselves, the potential exploitation for commercial use of an indigenous tribe’s
resources or knowledge calls for a greater protection from the government of the
indigenous community. Indigenous tribes want the profit-sharing benefits, but they
do not want those benefits to come at the expense of their land or traditions.228
Indigenous communities have a source of pride and respect for their land and the
need to take care of it.229 Thus, a bioprospector wanting to research a certain plant
within the indigenous community’s property needs to be regulated with the
223
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indigenous community on a case-by-case basis. The bioprospector will probably be
interested in any traditional knowledge a community may have with the plant to help
expedite the research process, which should include additional compensation and
credit prior to any profits made from the potential bioprospecting finding. The
relationship should also include, if the resource is valuable, any profits from use of
the extracted chemical that may be used in new biotechnology or medication.
There is limited discussion on preventing the outside world’s meddling into
indigenous communities. There is also limited discussion on allowing the indigenous
communities to co-own patents, which the traditional knowledge helped drive.
Without a dialogue between the indigenous communities, the government, and
potential profit seekers, the indigenous communities will continue to be
marginalized for lack of information and care concerning the indigenous interests
and interests of the land.
IV. CONCLUSION
Preserving the world’s biodiversity is important for present and future
generations. Creating new biotechnological advances to cure the world of ailments is
also important for these generations. The U.S. needs to enact legislation that can do
both. The lack of regulation will only hurt biodiversity and people in the long run.
The U.S. must prioritize regulations to guard against biopiracy and help researchers
find materials that might lead to other miracles.230 Even if there is no federal action,
individual states can legislate their own bioprospecting rules to regulate according to
their needs. Only through trial and error will a government know what does and does
not work, but inaction on bioprospecting will not protect biodiversity.231 Maybe now
that a celebrity is promoting action, something may get done.232
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